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There are two basic ways to control an Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle 
(UCAV) as it searches for targets: allow the UCAV to act autonomously or employ man-
in-the- loop control.  There are also two target sets of interest: fixed or mobile targets.  
This research focuses on UCAV-based targeting of mobile targets using man-in-the- loop 
control.  In particular, the interest is in how levels of satellite signal latency or signal 
degradation effect the ability to accurately track, target, and attack mobile targets.  This 
research establishes a weapon effectiveness model assessing targeting inaccuracies as a 
function of signal latency and/or signal degradation. The research involved three phases.   
The first phase in the research was to identify the levels of latency associated with 
satellite communications.  A literature review, supplemented by interviews with UAV 
operators, provided insight into the expected range latency values.     
The second phase of the research identified those factors whose value, in the 
presence of satellite signal latency, could influence targeting errors during UCAV 
employment.  The final phase involved developing and testing a weapon effectiveness 
model explicitly modeling satellite signal latency in UCAV targeting against mobile 
targets.  This phase included an effectiveness analysis study. 
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AN EXAMINATION OF LATENCY AND DEGRADATION ISSUES IN 
UNMANNED COMBAT AERIAL VEHCILE ENVIRONMENTS 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
General Issue  
 
Operations Allied Hope, Desert Shield, and Desert Storm were military operations 
that showcased the abilities of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).  UAVs provide 
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and command and control information to 
Allied commanders in real-time or near real- time format.  The success of UAVs raised 
the question about future roles for UAVs in military operations.  These roles include 
weaponization of UAVs and the use of UAVs for designation, grouped commonly as 
Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs).  A concern with UCAVs is the potential 
impact of time-delays or signal interruptions on UCAV to ground control unit (GCU) 
communications and interactions.  This research quantifies the potential impact of signal 
disruption and interruption on UCAV mission capability.  A prototype ARENA 
simulation model is defined, built, and used to quantify the effect of latency on an 
expected UCAV mission.   
Background 
 
Typical UCAV missions could be the attack of heavily defended high value 
targets, active Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), and target designation for 
standoff precision guided munitions.  The use of UAVs in a combat role is not a new 
idea.  The Israeli military has already used UAVs in actual combat.  The Israelis used 
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Electro-Optical seeking Maverick missiles attached to AQM-34 Lightning Bug drones to 
attack Soviet-built Egyptian air defenses in the Bekka Valley.  This tactic was successful 
in the 1970s, because the Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM) systems continued electro-
optical emissions while actively seeking targets.  Due to changes in system hardware and 
tactics, Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) systems no longer continually emit 
electromagnetic energy.  SAM system attacks now require TV-guided, laser-guided, or 
gravity munitions.  If the targets are mobile, then interruptions between the UCAV and 
satellites or ground control units controlling the UCAV can become an issue.  The source 
of these interruptions range from the time a signal takes to travel from a UCAV to GCU 
and back, commonly referred to as latency, to possible signal denial via adversary 
jamming.   
The Problem  
 
Little, if any, work has quantitatively examined how critical a signal time delay 
may be in operator-controlled UCAV missions.  We want to provide such an 
examination.  Thus, we ask, what is the impact of satellite latency and signal degradation 
on the mission capability of the Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle?  The true value of 
UCAVs lie in their ability to effectively perform those tasks deemed too dangerous for 
manned flight.  While autonomously guided weapons, like cruise missiles, already 
perform similar missions, they lack the ability to attack highly mobile targets or “targets-
of-opportunity”.  The UCAV provides a means to designate a target, such as with a laser 
designator, while a precision-guided munition, fired outside any lethal range of enemy 





The objective of this research is to develop and employ a methodology for 
quantifying the effects of control signal latency for the UCAV target designation mission.  
Part of this process is to develop an ARENA simulation model to examine latency issues.  
The first step is to identify the expected levels of satellite latencies accounting for 
degradation effects due to jamming and loss of satellite coverage.  For this research, these 
are identified through review of current literature and interviews with Air Force satellite 
operators, weapons system operators, and UCAV pilots.  Next, the latencies levels are 
input into the ARENA model to ascertain the amount of potential designation or weapon 
impact position error as a function of latency and degradation.  The intent is to help 
UCAV operators determine potential mission effectiveness in various theaters of 
operation.    
Scope of Research 
 
This research is limited to current and planned satellite constellations and UAV 
communication capabilities.  Within the satellite constellations, research is limited to 
those most likely to be used by theater UAVs.    
This research is limited to latency issues resulting from transmission via satellites 
and from degradation effects and how they affect the UCAVs’ ability to target a mobile 
target.  Our measures are precision munitions miss distances only.  We do not model 
probability of kill as a function of miss distance.    
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Contribution of Research 
 
To the best of our knowledge, the effects of latency have yet to be quantified 
other than notionally.  This study provides background on latency and an ARENA model 
for assessing UCAV combat capability while experiencing various levels of latencies. 
Our hope is that this knowledge will allow Air Force senior leaders to make more 
educated decisions on the UCAVs’ combat effectiveness under various operating 
conditions.   
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This chapter provides a thorough review of the literature relevant to this research 
effort.  Initially, we provide a current description of the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency funded UCAV Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD).  
Then we present the type of command and control structure that could be used by a 
UCAV, specifically addressing the autonomous and man- in-the- loop control methods.  
We then review current satellite orbitology and bandwidth requirements associated with 
UCAV systems.  Finally, we review the dynamic engineering equations used to 
determine the distance between a mobile target and the UCAVs laser designation when 
latency or signal degradation exists.  
UCAV ACTD Program 
 
In March of 1998, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, in 
conjunction with the U.S. Air Force, released a UCAV ACTD solicitation.  The purpose 
of the ACTD was to aid decision-makers in determining whether or not it was technically 
feasible to continue development of a UCAV system.  The primary objective of the 
UCAV ACTD was to design, develop, integrate, and demonstrate the targeting/weapons 
delivery, air vehicle design, human-systems interactions, command, control, and 
communications critical technologies pertaining to an operational UCAV system (1).   
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Figure 1.  UCAV Acquisition Strategy (1) 
 
The UCAV ACTD was divided into two phases (Fig 1.) where Phase II was 
conditioned upon positive results from Phase I.  Phase I was a 10-month trade study, 
analyses, and preliminary design phase with $4M in contracts awarded to four different 
contractor teams.  In April 1998, DARPA selected Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft 
Systems; Northrop Grumman Corporation, Military Aircraft Systems Division; Raytheon 
Co., Raytheon Systems Co.; and The Boeing Company, Information, Space & Defense 
Systems, Phantom Works as contractor team leads (2).   
 
Figure 2.  Phase I Milestone (1) 
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Phase I (Fig 2.) culminated with the decision to proceed to Phase II.  Phase II is a 
42-month phase, worth approximately $131M, awarded in March 1999 to The Boeing 
Company contractor team to develop, fabricate, and flight test demonstrator vehicles and 
a mission control station (3).  Boeing will develop and build two 27-ft-long, tailless 
UCAVs (see Fig 3.) with 34-ft wingspans that exploit real-time on-board and off-board 
sensors to detect, identify and locate both fixed and mobile targets (8).  In addition, 
Boeing will also develop a reconfigurable mission control system with line-of-sight and 
satellite relay communications links.    
 




Command and Control 
 
A critical UCAV operational issue is what degree of autonomy should be used to 
control a UCAV system.  The degree of autonomy used is a function of the level of 
technological maturity (9).  According to Major General Kostelnik, Air Armament Center 
(AAC) Commander, “the technologies that will make UCAVs capable in the future are 
not hardware technologies.  They are not airfoils, engines, or weapons.  We have those 
technologies at our fingertips.  The challenge lies in the software.  It’s all about 
connectivity and C2 ” (9).  Current UCAV literature identifies two methods of UCAV 
control: fully autonomous control or remotely piloted (man- in-the- loop) control.     
Autonomous Control 
 
A totally autonomous command and control structure is fully reliant on its own 
systems, such as automatic target recognition (ATR), to make engagement decisions (9).  
As the degree of UCAV autonomy increases, a UCAV system must possess an increased 
capability to sense changes in its environment and make appropriate decisions (4).  The 
combination of on-board sensors, control and analysis software, and pattern recognition 
software that gives UCAVs the ability to think for themselves is often referred to as their 
“wetware” (7).   
The question surrounding the development of “wetware” type of machine 
intelligence is how to ensure UCAVs make and learn the appropriate lessons in the 
presence of the fog and friction of warfare.  The ability of “wetware” to compensate for 
all uncertainties is analogous to the idea of totally replacing flight-testing with simulation 
techniques.  For example, simulation-based technology advocates have continually 
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expressed the opinion that with the advancement in simulation techniques, actual flight-
testing is no longer required.  However, flight-testing continues today, albeit at a 
diminished level, to identify those unknown interactions not accounted for or even 
recognized by the software designers.  A UCAV will ultimately function based upon the 
software designed by computer engineers and the engineers ability to design the software 
to handle all possible contingencies.  
Humans are by their nature intuitive creatures that can assimilate incomplete, 
conflicting, and confusing information and still produce reasonable courses of action (5).  
It is this skill and experience that the UCAV “wetware” seeks to replace.  The question is 
whether or not computer coding can exhibit the reasoning and cognitive capabilities of an 
experienced combat pilot (6)?  In addition, will this wonderous software package have 
the requisite reliability and maintainability attributes?  Finally, are we willing to let 
software (in the UCAV) cause potential fratricide and missed targeting given these events 
still occur with fully manned systems? 
One of the benefits of an autonomous UCAV is the lack of a data- link required to 
support command, control,  and communication (7).  The data link will still exist to 
unload mission changes to the UCAV; however, the data link is no longer directly tied to 
mission success.  This reduces the UCAV vulnerability to data- link jamming effects 
because as the degree of autonomous control increases, the need for two-way directional 
communications and data-transfer decreases (4).   
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Man-in-the-Loop (MITL) Control   
 
Like autonomous UCAVs, man- in-the- loop (MITL) systems have their own 
problems and benefits.  A MITL controlled UCAV requires a two-way 
communications/data- link.  The data link relays signals from the UCAV’s sensors to the 
remote controller who then returns instructions to the UCAV (4).  This can limit UCAV 
operations as the telemetry signals for each UCAV/controller combination must be 
unique, and satellite bandwidth availability limits the number of simultaneously operated 
UCAV aircraft (7).     
The first problem with MITL UCAV is the requirement for a data- link 
transmission.  Data- link or radio-control transmissions are vulnerable as there is no such 
thing as a jam-proof data- link (5,7).  The adversary’s jamming effort could occur at the 
most critical engagement moment – aiming and delivering ordnance (5).  The enemy only 
needs to jam the data- link for a few seconds, possibly even milli-seconds, to produce 
profound, and negative effects (5).  The impact of this disruption of the data- link 
(modeled in the form of a latency) is one of the areas of analysis addressed in this 
research. 
A second problem with MITL UCAV is the bandwidth requirements in an area of 
operations.  A satellite link is viewed as a possible solution to the difficulty imposed by 
the transmission of large quantities of data over existing communication technologies (5).  
The satellite impacts and bandwidth requirements for MITL UCAV operation are 
discussed later in this literature review. 
The worst scenario is an adversary jamming our signals and then taking control of 
the UCAV.  Unfortunately, this scenario has actually been realized albeit not in a UCAV 
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scenario.  A data-link controlled EOD (explosive ordinance disposal) robot was turned 
against its operator.  While the robot was disarming a bomb, the bomber successfully 
jammed and replaced the police signal controlling the robot and then directed the robot at 
the officers that were originally controlling the robot (7).  We mention this worst-case 
scenario but exclude its impact from our analysis.   
The risk of temporary, partial, or total interruption in the data- link between the 
UCAVs and mission control system must be evaluated when assessing the level of 
autonomy associated with UCAV employment.  Developing secure, over-the-horizon, 
anti-jam data- links is likely crucial to the future effectiveness of UCAVs (9). 
Satellite Connectivity 
 
A tolerable level of latency for targeting data depends significantly upon the 
target type, as shown in the notional chart in Figure 4 (10).  Relocatable targets require 
timely targeting, varying from hours to minutes, while moving targets require precise 
targeting, varying from seconds to milliseconds.  One significant factor that actually 




















LGB Artillery       Guns
Cannon         SFW
Rockets        LGB
Maverick      JSOW
Bombs        JDAM
Hellfire        AGS


























Figure 4.  Acceptabl e data time late versus target types (10) 
Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) 
 
Geosynchronous Earth Orbit is a stationary orbit located about 22,241 miles 
above the earth’s equator (11).  Satellite constellations in GEO provide communications 
coverage over a majority of the earth’s surface using just a few satellites.  However, due 
to the large distance a signal must travel, these satellites have a minimum 0.24 second 
signal latency (11).  This level of latency may or may not be acceptable to a MITL 
UCAV engagement against moving targets.  In addition, geosynchronous satellites cannot 
provide full coverage to the northern and southern hemispheres.  Finally, because GEO 
orbits are stationary, there is a limit to the number of satellites that can maintain this 
orbit, although geosynchronous satellites are relatively easy to track. 
Medium Earth Orbit (MEO)  
 
Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) is an orbit located from 6,250 to 12,500 miles above 
the earth’s surface (11).  Unlike GEO, MEO can cover the entire surface of the earth 
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because their relative position in the sky changes with time.  However, for full coverage 
of the earth, more satellites are required than with a GEO.  The advantage of MEO over 
GEO is that minimum signal latency is reduced from 0.24 seconds to the 0.06 – 0.14 
second range (11).  Again this level of latency may or may not be acceptable to a MITL 
UCAV engagement against moving targets.  In addition, because of their position 
changes with time, medium earth orbit satellites are not always in position to support 
combat operations.   
Low Earth Orbit (LEO) 
 
Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites normally orbit less than 3,150 miles above the 
earth’s surface, with the majority in the 400 – 1,000 mile range (11).  In terms of latency, 
LEO satellites are most suitable for MITL UCAV engagements because the inherent 
latency is measured in hundredths of seconds (11).  However, whether or not this level of 
latency is still unacceptable has not been determined.  Similar to MEO, LEO requires a 
large number of satellites to provide continuous coverage over the entire surface of the 
earth.  Additionally, the constellations fault tolerance, the ability to successfully operate 
when a percentage of the constellation malfunctions, for low earth orbit satellites, is quite 
large.  For example, computer modeling of the Iridium constellation, with only 45 percent 




In the envisioned high-tech combat operations of the future, the amount of 
bandwidth available for UCAV operations may be limited and thus a concern.  The 
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transmission of analysis quality target pictures significantly expands the amount of data 
that occupies available bandwidth (9).  If the data- link system gets overloaded, it may 
result in transmission delay (latency) or even shut down (9).   
With increasing autonomy, UCAV demands for data- link capacity and thus 
bandwidth will decrease.  Thus, for a full autonomous UCAV with human-like cognitive 
and reasoning ability, the requirement for data- link bandwidth is no more than a manned 
combat aircraft (6).  However, if some MITL control is present, it is reasonable to assume 
that necessary video transmissions would greatly increase the bandwidth requirements, 
especially if multiple UCAVs are operating simultaneously within close proximity.  With 
poor compression techniques, bandwidth requirements will typically be on the order of 
tens of Megabits per second (6).  In addition, this bandwidth requirement can grow to the 
order of 10 GHz per UCAV when employing a spreading ratio for signal modulation in a 
jamming environment (6). 
“Such bandwidth requirements are arguably not implementable over satellite 
microwave links, given the established antenna and transmission technology base, and 
the need for both redundancy and the concurrent support of multiple UCAVs in a given 
area of operations” (6). 
Dynamic Engineering Equations  
 
In order to ascertain the precision munitions miss distance, it is necessary to use 
several dynamic equations relating location with speed, acceleration, and direction.   
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The distance a mobile target travels per unit time is a function of its speed.  When 
the target is moving with a constant speed, the distance covered is given by the speed 
times time. 
TIME * SPEED  DISTANCE =    (2.1) 
When the speed of the target is non-constant, the target has an acceleration (deceleration) 
component.  Acceleration is the change in speed (final – initial) divided by the length of 
time required for the speed change.  If the change in speed is negative (positive), the 





=   (2.2) 
When the targets acceleration is constant, but the speed is non-constant Eq. 2.1 is 





=  (2.3) 




TIME*SPEED INITIAL DISTANCE +=  (2.4) 
In the next chapter, these equations are used in the development of a UCAV 
latency model. 
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The purpose of this research is to develop and implement a methodology for 
quantifying the effects of signal latency on UCAV targeting effectiveness.  An ARENA 
discrete-event simulation model was designed, built and tested, and used to demonstrate 
the methodology.  The ARENA model captured latency effects in the UCAV to GCS 
two-way signal and control link.  This chapter discusses the particulars of modeling the 
communication links and the specifics of the study demonstrating the methodology.   
Assumptions  
 
Several assumptions were required in order to simplify the UCAV laser 
designation scenario.  The first assumption is that the lazing of the mobile ground target 
is always successful.  The model does not account for different levels of laser returns 
based upon angles of incident and whether or not the laser is actually on the target.  
Another assumption involving the laser designation is that once the designator is turned 
on, it stays on.  A third assumption assumes that the GCS operator’s cueing data once 
received, is instantaneous and 100% accurate in relation to a desired weapon impact 
point.  We assume perfect designator accuracy given a specific GCS command.  
Additionally, the effects of any terrain elevation or location were assumed to be 
negligible.  We do not model bandwidth effects, or picture quality to GCS.  The Arena 
model also does not account for weapon delivery altitudes, type of weapon, seeker 
gimble limits, or a weapons’ ability to make last second corrections to strike a target at 
the laser designation point. 
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UCAV to Ground Control Station (GCS) Transmission  
 
The ARENA model simulates the transmission of video from the UCAV to the 
GCS as snap shot pictures of a mobile ground target.  The GCS operator is attempting to 
designate that mobile target in order to deploy a precision guided munition.  The GCS 
operator designation command is based on the picture presented on the workstation 
Frequency of Transmission 
 
The video transmission from the UCAV to the GCS is actually a continuous 
process.  Within ARENA, the process is discretized.  The trade-off in this discretization 
process is modeling fidelity versus computing speed.  We model a picture transmission 
every 0.001 seconds, as this provided a reasonable level of run-time and model fidelity.   
Delivery of Transmission 
 
Two factors help determine whether or not the GCS receives the transmitted 
pictures from the UCAV.  These factors are the latency of the signal and whether the 
signal is jammed or lost.   
The effects of signal latency are examined across a full range of latency levels.  
Because no specific data currently exists dictating how to model satellite latency, we 
chose 6 latency bands.  The lower and upper bounds for each band are shown in Table 1.  
Each band was used in a simulation scenario with actual latencies modeled as uniformly 
distributed within the latency band. 
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Table 1.  UCAV-GCS Latency Bounds  
 
Sets Lower Bound (sec) Upper Bound (sec) 
Set 1 0.0001 0.0005 
Set 2 0.001 0.005 
Set 3 0.01 0.05 
Set 4 0.1 0.5 
Set 5 1 5 
Set 6 10 50 
 
The latency time for each signal determines delivery time from sender (UCAV or 
GCS) to receiver (GCS or UCAV).  For example, if Picture A was sent by the UCAV at 
the 10-second mark of the simulation, and this picture has a 4-second latency, the GCS 
would receive Picture A at the 14-second mark.  However, since the actual latencies are 
random variables it is possible for subsequent picture deliveries to occur out of sequence.  
For example, if Picture B was sent at the 11-second mark with a 2-second latency, the 
GCS would receive Picture B at the 13-second mark.  This is one second before Picture A 
arrives at the GCS, which we deem impossible.  To solve this problem, if a picture is 
scheduled to arrive prior to a preceding picture, the picture is considered lost (Picture B 
in this example).  Additionally pictures sent, or currently delayed, when the link between 
the UCAV and GCS is lost or jammed, are also considered lost.  
Perceived Versus Ground Truth 
 
The concern with signal latency during UCAV targeting missions is targeting 
error due to a disconnect between perception (what the operator sees as a target location) 
and truth (what is the actual target location).  Any signal delay means the operator is 
effectively viewing the past (not the present).  The ARENA model tracks ground truth 
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(actual target location) and operator perception.  A UCAV designator is pointed based on 
operator commands.  Final miss distances are calculated based on ground truth and GCS-
commanded target designation locations.  The research hypothesis is that latency 
increases the difference between ground truth and operator perception and this equates to 
increased weapons miss distances at impact (see Fig 5). 
 
Figure 5.  Hypothesized Signal Latency to Miss-Distance Relationship 
 
Ground Control Station (GCS) to UCAV Transmission 
 
The ARENA model also simulates the transmission of GCS command data for a 
laser designator mounted on the UCAV.  The GCS operator is attempting to center the 
designator on the mobile target.  The GCS operator designator centering commands are 
based on coordinates corresponding to the view in the GCS system (the operator 
perception).  
 





- - - 
Distance 
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Frequency of Transmission 
 
The command data transmission from the GCS to the UCAV is discretized in the 
same manner as previously discussed for the video transmission.  However, the GCS 
does not actually begin transmitting designation command information until the time to 
turn the designator on has been reached and a transmission has been received from the 
UCAV. 
Delivery of Transmission 
 
Latency and jamming effect control data transmission just as it effects video 
transmissions.  However, bandwidth requirements for control data are less than required 
for video transmission.  Thus the latency bands considered are different than those used 
for the UCAV-to-GCS link.  These bands are provided in Table 2.  There are also two 
important differences when modeling the GCS-to-UCAV link.   




The first difference is the scenario time must be greater than our equal to the 
desired time for designating.  For example, the majority of engagements using a laser 
designator actually do not begin “lazing” a target until the final portion of the attack.  
This minimizes a target’s ability to take defensive measures after being warned by a 
Sets Lower Bound (sec) Upper Bound (sec) 
Set 1 0.00001 0.00005 
Set 2 0.0001 0.0005 
Set 3 0.001 0.005 
Set 4 0.01 0.05 
Set 5 0.1 0.5 
Set 6 1 5 
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laser-warning receiver.  Our Arena model runs 30 second engagement scenarios with 
designating commencing in the final 10 seconds of the engagement. 
The second difference is that the UCAV must receive a transmission from the 
GCS in order to designate.  There are two ways for the UCAV not to receive the 
designation command: the link is lost (jammed) when the transmission is sent or while 
the transmission is being delayed (GCS-UCAV latency factor).  If the UCAV never 
receives a transmission from the GCS, the laser designator on the UCAV is never turned 
on by the GCS command.   
Laser Designation Location 
 
The scenario associated with determining the location designated by the GCS is 
depicted in Figure 6.  The black tank is used to depict an actual target, while the gray tank 
symbolizes the location of the target as displayed in the GCS.  The first segment (6a) 
shows the UCAV transmitting the actual target location to a satellite.  The second 
segment (6b) shows the delivery of the UCAV transmission to the GCS monitor, and the 
GCS designation point (depicted by the cross-hair on the monitor).  Because the signal 
from the UCAV to the GCS is delayed (due to latency), 6b shows the disconnect between 
the actual target and the target seen by the GCS.  The final segment, Figure 6c, shows the 
UCAV designating the location specified by the GCS operator.  Again due to latency, 
there is a disconnect between the actual location designated (depicted by white cross-
hair) and GCS displayed designation location.  The over-all miss-distance between the 
actual target and the location designated has two components.  The first component is the 
difference between the actual target location and the target location perceived by the 
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GCS.  The second component is the difference between the displayed designation 












In addition to the standard latency between the UCAV and GCS transmissions, 
the ARENA model simulates three jamming environments.  These three levels are low, 
medium, and high.  The percentage chance of loss of transmission for each level is 
randomly assigned.  The low level has a 0 – 33% chance of signal loss, while the medium 
level has a 33 – 66% chance of signal loss.  Finally, the high level has a 66 – 100 % 
chance.  The value assigned to each jamming level is arbitrary since no data was found 
related to UCAV jamming environments.  If a transmission is lost due to jamming, the 
ARENA model also determines how long the transmission is lost. 
Analysis Methodology 
 
ARENA results are miss distance statistics for each latency and jamming level 
examined.  These data are plotted to produce latency versus miss distance plots and the 
data is analyzed to assess statistical significance between mean miss distances.  
Additional modeling is used to hone in on those segments of the resulting latency versus 
miss distance plot deemed of interest.  Targets move at either constant speed or accelerate 
to some maximum speed. 
Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter explained the basic underlining methodology used in an Arena 
model to simulate the impact that satellite latency and transmission loss has on UCAV 
laser designation employment.  A description of the ARENA model is found in Appendix 
A.  The next chapter presents simulation results and their analysis. 
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This chapter describes the results associated with four different engagement 
scenarios.  The first scenario involves a non-maneuvering ground target moving at 
constant velocity in a jam-free environment.  The second scenario, also in a jam-free 
environment, involves an accelerating ground target.  The third examines the potential 
effects of jamming on engagement accuracy against a non-maneuvering ground target.  
The fourth scenario involves a ground target, in a jam-free environment, which randomly 
changes direction every 5 seconds.  Each scenario is replicated 100 times at each latency 
setting.  Latency is modeled as a discretized process.  We examine average latency levels 
of 0.0003, 0.003, 0.03, 0.3, 3, and 30 seconds.  Although we realize latencies around 30 
seconds are operationally unacceptable, these levels were used to primarily bound the 
process and provide insight.  Actual tabulated data for the figures in this section can be 
found in Appendix B. 
Scenario One:  Constant Velocity, Non-maneuvering Target  
 
Both signal latency and ground target velocity impact potential targeting miss 
distance.  These relationships are direct and linear in logarithmic form. 
Figure 7 depicts, on log scale, the average miss distance as a function of signal 
latency for each target ground speed modeled.  As expected, target ground speed directly 
influences miss distance – higher speeds mean larger differences.  As expected, near real 
time latency translates to very low miss distances (less than a foot).  The implication is 
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Figure 7.  Mobile Target Engagement with Constant Velocity (30-second engagement) 
 
Latency and target velocity also influences the miss distance distribution.  Since 
signal latency is modeled as a random variable with a specified mean, the miss distance is 
also a random variable.  For very low signal latency there is nearly zero variance.  
However, as seen in Table 3, the variance of observations increases as latency and ground 
target speed increases.  This is expected as both parameters introduce greater levels of 
uncertainty into the model scenario.   
 
Table 3.  Avg Miss Distance Variance (Scenario 1, 30-second engagement) 
Latency (sec) Velocity (ft/s) 
 50 40 30 20 10 
0.0003 0.000030 0.000019 0.000011 0.000005 0.000001 
0.003 0.002475 0.001584 0.000891 0.000396 0.000099 
0.03 0.046257 0.029604 0.016652 0.007401 0.001850 
0.3 0.621548 0.397791 0.223757 0.099448 0.024862 
3 7.097151 4.542176 2.554974 1.135544 0.283886 
30 0.000676 0.000432 0.000243 0.000108 0.000027 
 
 
At the lower latency levels (milli-second range), the variance of the miss distance 
is quite small regardless of the target speed.  For instance, at the 0.0003-second latency 
level, the miss distance is 0.00003 and 0.000001 ft for target velocities of 50 and 10 ft/s, 
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respectively.  Table 3 indicates a dramatic decrease in the variance when the average 
satellite latency increases from 3 to 30 seconds.  However, the decrease in variance is not 
due to an improved process capability, but a result of the scenario length combined with 
the large average satellite latency.  With a 30-second average satellite latency, a large 
number of the 30-second scenarios end before the GCS receives a single picture.  The end 
result is a decrease in the variance.   
60-Second Simulation 
 
To gain additional insight on the 30-second simulation length, we examined the 
impact from increasing the scenario length to 60 seconds.  Figure 8 depicts, on log scale, 
the average miss distance as a function of signal latency for each target ground speed 
modeled.  As expected, the length of scenario does not significantly change the overall 
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Figure 8.  Mobile Target Engagement with Constant Velocity (60-second engagement) 
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Table 4.  Avg Miss Distance Variance (Scenario 1, 60-second engagement) 
Latency (sec) Velocity (ft/s) 
 50 40 30 20 10 
0.0003 0.000048 0.000031 0.000017 0.000008 0.000002 
0.003 0.003126 0.002001 0.001125 0.000500 0.000125 
0.03 0.058316 0.037322 0.020994 0.009331 0.002333 
0.3 0.545407 0.349060 0.196346 0.087265 0.021816 
3 5.861970 3.751661 2.110309 0.937915 0.234479 
30 61.153673 39.138351 22.015322 9.784588 2.446147 
 
As expected, with a 30-second satellite latency, the average miss distance 
increased for a 60-second simulation because the target has more time to move and the 
GCS receives few position updates.  Table 4 shows that the variance of observations 
expands as latency and ground target speed increases.  As expected, we did not have a 
decrease in variance, similar to Table 3, when the average satellite latency increased from 
3 to 30 seconds.  Since the simulation length increased from 30 to 60 seconds, the GCS 
does receive a few picture updates, which was not the case for the 30-second simulation. 
Focused Latencies 
 
To gain a better understanding on the average miss distance in the 1 to 10 second 
latency range, we examined average latency levels of 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 seconds.   
Figure 9 depicts the average miss distance as a function of signal latency for each 
target ground speed modeled.  As expected, the relationship is still linear in form where 
target ground speed directly influences miss distance – higher speeds mean larger 
differences.  The implication is clear; full second signal delays result in inaccurate bombs 
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Figure 9.  Mobile Target Engagement with Constant Velocity (Latency 2-7 sec) 
Scenario Two: Accelerating, Non-maneuvering Target 
 
Signal latency, initial ground target velocity, and ground target acceleration 
impact potential targeting miss distance.   
Figures 10 and 11 depict, on log scale, the average miss distance as a function of 
signal latency for each initial target ground speed with accelerations of 2 and 4 ft/sec2, 
respectively.  To ensure the ground targets velocity does not exceed a reasonable value, 
the ground targets were given a maximum velocity.  As expected, target acceleration 
directly influences miss distance.  Accelerations mean larger miss distance differences as 
compared to a constant velocity ground target.  However, by comparing Figures 10 and 
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Figure 10.  Accelerating Ground Target (2 ft/sec2), Vmax = 100 ft/sec 
 
As expected, near real time latency translates to very low miss distances (less than 
a foot), even when the target is accelerating.  The implication is clear; with low levels of 
latency, the impact of acceleration on miss distance is small; however, as latency 
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Figure 11.  Accelerating Ground Target (4 ft/sec2), Vmax = 100 ft/sec 
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Scenario Three:  Constant Velocity, Non-Maneuvering Target (w/ Jamming) 
 
Any level of jamming (signal interruption) severely impacts potential targeting 
miss distance.  This relationship caused total transmission disruption at high latency 
levels.   
Figure 12 depicts, on log scale, the average miss distance in a low-level jamming 
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Figure 12.  Low Level Jamming Engagement 
 
As expected, target ground speed directly influences miss distance – higher 
speeds mean larger differences.  Any level of latency translates to large miss distances.  
The implication is clear; any level of jamming or signal interruption during simulation 
means poor targeting accuracy resulting in inaccurate bombs. 
As the level of jamming is increased, the amount of transmissions lost increase.  
Figures 13 and 14 show the impact of increasing the jamming level. 
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Figure 14.  High Level Jamming Engagement 
 
Jamming also influences the miss distance distribution.  Since jamming is 
modeled as a random variable with a specified mean, the miss distance is also a random 
variable.  The variances of observations are extremely large when jamming is present 
regardless of the level of latency and ground target speed.  This is expected as jamming 
introduces large levels of uncertainty into the model scenario. 
UCAV - GCS 
transmissions lost 
UCAV - GCS 
transmissions lost 
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Scenario Four:  Constant Velocity, Maneuvering Target  
 
Both signal latency and ground target velocity impact potential targeting miss 
distance; however, maneuvering capability does not impact the average potential 
targeting miss distance.   
Figure 15 depicts, on log scale, the average miss distance of a maneuvering 
ground target as a function of signal latency for each ground speed modeled.  For 
convenience, Figure 7, which depicts, on log scale, the average miss distance of a non-
maneuvering ground target as a function of signal latency for each ground speed 
modeled, is reproduced as Figure 16 for comparative purposes.  As expected, the ability 
of a target to maneuver does not significantly change miss distance above the influences 
due to target ground speed and latency.  Comparison of Figures 15 and 16 confirms the 
lack of influence of maneuverability on average miss distance.  This result may be an 
artifact of the random natures of the maneuvers and thus further investigation should be 
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Figure 16.  Non-Maneuvering Target with Constant Velocity 
 
Maneuvering, similar to latency and target velocity, does influence the miss 
distance distribution.  Like signal latency, mobile ground target’s direction is modeled as 
a random variable with a specified mean.  As seen in Table 5, the variance of 
observations expands as latency and ground target speed increase.  Since we have 
introduced an additional level of uncertainty, we expected an increase in variance over a 
non-maneuvering target.  A comparison of Table 3 (non-maneuvering target) and Table 5 
(maneuvering target) shows that introducing the maneuvering capability does cause the 
miss distance variance to increase. 
Table 5.  Avg Miss Distance Variance (Scenario 4) 
Latency (sec) Velocity (ft/s) 
 50 40 30 20 10 
0.0003 0.000030 0.000019 0.000011 0.000005 0.000001 
0.003 0.003185 0.002038 0.001146 0.000510 0.000127 
0.03 0.043933 0.028117 0.015816 0.007029 0.001757 
0.3 0.720447 0.461086 0.259361 0.115272 0.028818 
3 7.857572 5.028846 2.828726 1.257212 0.314303 






Satellite Connectivity Baselines 
 
Each type of satellite connectivity carries some minimum signal latency.  Our 
results suggest an average miss distance on the order of 10 feet for GEO, 1-10 feet for 
MEO and less than a foot for LEO.  These are conservative estimates based on minimum 
signal latencies rather than actual observed latency values. 
Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter explained the impacts that satellite latency and ground target speeds, 
associated with four different engagement scenarios, have on average miss distance.  
Regardless of the scenario, target ground speed directly influences miss distance – higher 
speeds mean larger differences.  Also, as expected the greater the satellite latency level, 
the greater the average miss distances.  Jamming effects included severe loss of 
transmission signal and large average miss distances at even very low latency levels.  
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V.  Conclusions  
 
 
Satellite signal latency, ground target velocity, and jamming environment impact 
potential targeting miss distance with varying degrees of severity.  Regardless of 
scenario, the higher the target ground speeds, the larger the average miss distances.  Also, 
as expected, the greater the satellite latency leve l, the greater the average miss distances.  
However, at lower latency levels, the average miss distances are quite reasonable (less 
than a foot) regardless of speed.  The introduction of jamming greatly influences the miss 
distances.  When jamming is present with high levels of latency, the transmission 
between the UCAV and GCS is lost.  In addition, with jamming scenarios, miss distances 
are still quite large even at low levels of satellite latency.   
Latency, jamming and target velocity also influences the miss distance 
distribution.  Since signal latency and jamming are modeled as random variables with a 
specified means, the miss distance is also a random variable.  Therefore, as latency 
increases and/or jamming is present, the variance of observations expands.  This is 
expected as levels of uncertainty are introduced into the model scenario. 
Literature Review Findings 
 
  This research provides a thorough review of literature relevant to the use of a 
UCAV as a laser designator for precision munitions against ground mobile targets.  We 
present the type of command and control structure that could be used by a UCAV, 
specifically addressing the autonomous and man- in-the- loop control methods.  We then 
review current satellite orbitology to better understand possible levels of satellite latency.  
Associated with satellite latency was bandwidth requirements of UCAV systems.  
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Finally, we review the dynamic engineering equations used to determine the distance 
between a mobile target and the UCAVs laser designation when latency or signal 
degradation exists.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
 
Recommendations can be made that could confirm this research.  The first 
recommendation is to identify true satellite latency levels between a UCAV and GCS in 
multiple environments.  Since the jamming scenarios show such a large impact on 
average miss distances and transmission capability, the second recommendation would be 
to develop a more realistic jamming environment model based upon actual data.  A third 
recommendation would be to develop a user-friendly interface to the model for input 
parameters and scenario definition. 
Additionally, several recommendations can be made that could expand the 
capabilities of this research model.  The first recommendation would be to incorporate a 
laser designation algorithm.  This algorithm should take into account probability of 
designation, angle of incidence, heading angles, and other factors.  A second 
recommendation would be to incorporate a GCS operation algorithm to take into account 
operator error.  A third recommendation would be some weapon effectiveness algorithm.  
This algorithm should include attributes of type of weapon, weather effects, delivery 
altitudes, seeker gimble limits, and weapon energy envelopes.  This would augment miss 
distance data with lethality assessments to provide probability of target kill information. 
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Appendix A.  ARENA MODEL 
 
This Appendix explains the basic layout of our ARENA model to include variable 
definitions and algorithm design.  All the process variables can be accessed from the 
Basic Process Template by selecting [Variable].  Table 6 depicts the variables (and their 
definition) that are set-up prior to each scenario.  The variables in Table 6 do not change 
their value during each replication. 
Table 6.  Initial Setting Variables 
MessageFreq Frequency of Messages Sent From UCAV and GCS 
UGLB UCAV to GCS Latency Lower Bound 
UGUB UCAV to GCS Latency Upper Bound 
Atar Target Acceleration 
GULB GCS to UCAV Latency Lower Bound 
GUUB GCS to UCAV Latency Upper Bound 
TOF Time of Flight (Scenario Length) 
TTD Time to Designate (Measured from end of Scenario)  
VtarMax Maximum Velocity of Target 
VUCAV Velocity of UCAV 
AUCAV Acceleration of UCAV 
FreqMove Frequency of Target Changing Direction 
CdirLB Target Change of Direction Lower Bound 
CDirUB Target Change of Direction Upper Bound 
UCAVHeading UCAV Heading 
JAM LEVEL Jamming Environment Level (1, 2, or 3) 
 
Table 7 depicts the Boolean variables incorporated within the ARENA model.  
DESIGNATOR, TgtChgDir, and JAM ENVIRO are set prior to each scenario.  
JAMMED, REC, and SET are changed during a simulation.  
Table 7.  Boolean Variables (1 = Yes) 
DESIGNATOR Is Designator Turned On? 
TgtChgDir Is Target Manuevering? 
JAMMED Is Transmission Currently Jammed? 
REC Has UCAV Received a Transmission From GCS? 
SET Has the Percentage Chance of Jamming Been Set? 
JAM ENVIRO Does the Potential For Jamming Exist? 
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Table 8 depicts the remainder of the variables used within the ARENA model. 
Table 8.  Global Variables 
VTarUpdate Updated Target Velocity (place holder variable)  
VTar Target Velocity 
TX X-Direction Location of Target 
TY Y-Direction Location of Target 
TOJ Time Jamming Occurred 
LOJ Length of Jam 
DIR Heading of Target 
GX X-Direction of Target Seen By GCS 
GY Y-Direction of Target Seen By GCS 
TSL_Update Time Since Last Update 
TL_Update Time of Last Update 
LXLoc X-Location of Laser 
LYLoc Y-Location of Laser 
DELAY1 Length of Delay of Signal From UCAV to GCS 
DELAY2 Length of Delay of Signal From GCS to UCAV 
VStor Stored Perceived Velocity of Target as Last Seen By GCS 
AStor Stored Perceived Acceleration of Target as Last Seen By GCS 
Sdir Stored Perceived Direction of Target as Last Seen By GCS 
LastPicture Time Last Transmission Received from UCAV 
TIMEi Time Current Message Received by GCS 
TIMEj Time Current Message Received by UCAV 
LEVEL Percentage Chance of Transmission Jammed 
     
 Figures 17 – 21 depict the algorithms found in ARENA 5.0 file 
UCAV_Baseline18Feb.  The file is a baseline model not including the jamming 
environment capability.  Each figure depicts their respective flow of information. 
 




Figure 18.  GCS to UCAV Transmission Algorithm w/o Jamming 
 
 
Figure 19.  Target Maneuvering Algorithm 
 
 
Figure 20.  Target Update/End Simulation Algorithm 
 
 
Figure 21.  Designation Algorithm 
labMin     V— 
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Figures 22 – 24 depict the changes in algorithms from the baseline model.  The 
jamming model can be found in ARENA 5.0 file UCAV_Jam18Feb.  Figure 22 (23) 
shows the change to the UCAV to GCS (GCS to UCAV) Transmission Algorithm when 
jamming potential is added to model.  Figure 24 depicts the actual jamming algorithm. 
 
Figure 22.  UCAV to GCS Transmission Algorithm w/ Jamming 
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14. ABSTRACT   
     There are two basic ways to control an Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) as it searches for targets, allow the UCAV to act autonomously 
or employ man-in-the-loop control.  There are also two target sets of interest: fixed or mobile targets.  This research focuses on UCAV-based targeting 
of mobile targets using man-in-the-loop control.  In particular, the interest is in how levels of satellite signal latency or signal degradation effect the 
ability to accurately track, target, and attack mobile targets.  This research establishes a weapon effectiveness model assessing targeting inaccuracies 
as a function of signal latency and/or signal degradation.  The research involved three phases.  The first phase in the research was to identify the levels 
of latency associated with satellite communication.  A literature review, supplemented by interviews with UAV operators, provided insight into the 
expected range of latency values.  The second phase of the research identified those factors whose value, in the presence of satellite latency, could 
influence targeting errors during UCAV employment.  The final phase involved developing and testing a weapon effectiveness model explicitly 
modeling satellite latency in UCAV targeting against mobile targets.  This phase included an effectiveness analysis study.  
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